Monthly cohorts. Figure A3 replicates Figure 2 but zooms into cohorts defined by month and year of birth instead of year of birth. For comparison with Figure 2 , for any given year t when the wage is measured, monthly birth cohorts are translated into monthly age bins as of end of year t. For example, 27 in 2009 means being born in January 1982 (and ineligible for the tax cut). 26+11/12 in 2009 means being born in December 1983 and thus eligible for the tax cut. The top panel depicts net wages (monthly wage earnings net of payroll taxes). The bottom panel depicts gross wages (i.e. gross of payroll taxes). The top panel shows that the wages are continuous at the age thresholds, except for small school-year e↵ects already present pre-reform and also away from the reform age threshold. The school system is based on calendar year of birth (and hence people born in December of year t are in general 1 year more advanced in their career path than people born in January of year t + 1). In contrast, the bottom panel of Figure A3 shows that the gross wage is discontinuous at the eligibility thresholds. Therefore, these results confirm the earlier findings from Figure 2 . Corresponding estimates are provided in Table 1 , Panel B, and are even closer to 100 percent pass-through to employers than our annual based estimates.
Long-term jobs vs. spot markets. Another potential explanation for the zero net-wage incidence points to the long-term nature of real-world employment relationships, whereas the conceptual framework applies to a spot market for labor. Some young employees will age out of the payroll tax cut over the course of the job. Indeed, it has been documented extensively by Bewley (2002) that employers believe that they cannot easily cut nominal wages as this has deleterious e↵ects on morale and hence productivity of workers.
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Ex post, it would attenuate the scope for wage cuts as workers age across the threshold, and, anticipating this, employers would attenuate wage increases for the young ex ante.
However, a substantial fraction of young Swedish workers have short employment spells and hence would not be expected to ever age out of the payroll tax cut on the job, which we document in Appendix Figure A2 by plotting various percentiles of job length by age of hiring 54 For the United States, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) document that 84 percent of employers deem a series of a higher wages followed by a cut more demoralizing than having paid the final low wage for the entire period. The specific question (8, on p. 779) refers to a 10 percent cut, almost exactly the wage cut required by our scenario (12 percent). The specific question is: "A. Assume that for the past five years, you paid wages that were 10 percent lower than the wages you actually paid. [...] B. Assume that for the previous four years, you had paid the same wages that you actually paid, and then cut wages by 10 percent in the current year. [...] In which situation would you expect workers' e↵ort and morale to be worse?" for individuals newly hired in 2000. It shows that the median spell length of young hires (aged 20-24) is less than two years. Hence, many such young workers could in principle be hired at higher wages.
Even for workers that are expected to age out of eligibility, such downward wage rigidity would merely attenuate initial pass-through to workers, not eliminate it entirely, as incidence can be spread across a smooth wage. 55 In our context, even a constant wage would exhibit a noticeable bump: even the barely-eligible median worker will spend at least one full calendar year -i.e. on average half of her two-year tenure -in the low-tax regime (since the eligibility criteria apply to cohorts by birth-year rather than daily age; consider the monthly cohorts in Figure A3 ); thus the cut lowers around half of her present-value labor costs.
In Appendix Figure A5 , we empirically investigate whether net wages exhibit incidence in high turnover industries, in which shorter job spells should attenuate dynamic concerns associated with long-term jobs. Our turnover measure is the average job duration of new job spells. We compute the mean duration of new jobs in 2000 for workers aged 20-25, within each of our coarsest industry measure (10 industries). We then split industries by the median average job duration (weighted by 2000 employment). The top panel replicates our original net-wage analysis of Figure 2 separately for high-turnover industries, and the bottom panel does so for low-turnover industries. Even in the high-turnover industries, net wages exhibit no discontinuity around the age eligibility threshold during the reform years. This result is perhaps not surprising in light of the stability of the wage distribution we previously documented in Figure 3 . But it does suggest that while turnover is already high among young workers, our incidence results hold up in subsamples even closer to a spot labor market.
Therefore, the absence of tax incidence on wages cannot be explained solely by the concern that all young hires will age out of the payroll tax eligibility on the job and that long-term jobs would mask tax incidence.
A.2 Market-Level Employment E↵ects
Heterogeneity by local unemployment rate. The stated goal of the policy was to reduce youth unemployment because of a perception among policy makers that youth unemployment was excessively high. In 2006, just before the reform, there was wide variation across Sweden's 21 regions in youth unemployment. Appendix Figure A11 provides a map of Sweden showing youth unemployment rates by quintiles (weighted by labor force size). Regions in the lowest quintile of youth unemployment rates had rates in the range 10.5-12.4 percent while regions in the highest quintile had youth unemployment rates in the range 20-23.3 percent, i.e. about twice as high. Hence, a natural question is whether the payroll tax cut is more e↵ective at stimulating employment in regions where the unemployment rate is higher, and hence presumably furthest away from its e cient level.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 depicts the pre vs. post-reform employment rates by age (as we did in the top panel) but separately for bottom quintile regions (in dark red) and top quintile regions (in lighter red) in terms of youth unemployment rate in 2006. To reduce clutter in the graph, we consider only a single pre period of 2005-06 and a single post period of 2012-13. The graph shows that the employment e↵ects of the payroll tax cut appear much larger in the high unemployment regions -for many cohorts in excess of 5 percentage points o↵ a smaller initial base -than in the low unemployment regions.
55 Elsby (2009) and Shimer (2004) present variants of these arguments in non tax contexts. Table A2 . Column (1) reports the average local youth unemployment rate in each quintile. Within each quintile, we follow the methodology from the first row of Table 2 to estimate employment e↵ects. We regress employment to labor force ratio on period dummies, age dummies and the interaction of the post-reform dummy and a payroll tax cut eligibility dummy (ages 20-26) . We show the estimated employment e↵ects in column (2) of Table A2 . The table shows that the employment e↵ects are monotonically increasing with the local youth unemployment rate, from 1.0 percentage points in the bottom quintile up to 3.4 percentage points in the top quintile. Comparing columns (1) and (2), we can see that employment e↵ects are increasing even relative to the local initial unemployment rate as the employment e↵ect in the bottom quintile is 9.3 percent of the unemployment in 2006 in the bottom quintile but 16.0 percent of the unemployment in 2006 in the top quintile. Hence, besides replicating our nationwide analysis across subregions, these results show that the payroll tax cut subsidy appears noticeably more e↵ective in high unemployment regions, consistent with the stated goal of the policy.
Are wage e↵ects di↵erent across these areas? In principle, with low unemployment rates, it might be di cult for employers to find young workers, perhaps leading to the biding up of their wage more in line with the canonical equilibrium predictions of tax incidence. Column (3) shows the estimates of the pass-through of the payroll tax cut to firms by the local unemployment rate following the method from Table 1. Estimates are slightly above 100 percent for all quintiles. Hence, there is no evidence that pass-through estimates are lower in low unemployment rate regions.
One concern about the di↵erential employment e↵ects we have uncovered is that regions with high initial youth unemployment rate might naturally mean-revert over time, leading the employment rate of youth to increase relative to regions with low youth unemployment rate even absent the reform. To address this concern, we generate a placebo analysis where we again split Swedish regions into quintiles, but do so based on 2002 unemployment rates. We then estimate employment e↵ects comparing years 1998-2002 to years 2003-2006 (i.e ., before the start of the reform). Column (4) in Table A2 displays the unemployment rates in each quintile, and they are roughly comparable in level and variation to the unemployment rates from the real experiment in column (1). However, the placebo employment e↵ects presented in column (5) are all small (less than 0.5 percentage point in absolute value) and insignificant. In particular, the di↵erence in placebo employment e↵ects between the top quintile and the bottom quintile is less than 1 percentage point and insignificant (relative to 2.4 points and highly significant in the real experiment).
A.3 Robustness Check: Other Concurrent Reforms
There are two labor market reforms that coincide with the reform we study: (1) a reform to the structure of temporary contracts, and (2) a separate hiring subsidy for unemployed job seekers. Below we describe these reforms in detail and perform additional robustness checks. We conclude that neither reform appears to confound the treatment e↵ects of the youth payroll tax cut we study, at the market and firm levels. The key reason is that neither policy was age-specific and did not benefit young workers more than somewhat older workers.
A.3.1 New Start Jobs: Hiring Subsidy for Unemployed Job Seekers
In 2007, a hiring subsidy for unemployed workers was introduced, the "New Start Jobs" program. First, we provide a detailed description of the reform. Second, we conduct robustness checks that confirm that our results cannot be due to this new program.
Description and eligibility. In January 2007, the government introduced a new program called the New Start Jobs. The policy meant that employers hiring individuals who have been 56 We have collapsed the frequency of our workhorse data set at the annual level (employment status in November) and do not di↵erentiate job switchers between panel observations, such that our decomposition may be subject to some degree of time aggregation bias, i.e. an overestimation of the decline in the separation rate.
57 Recall that the employment rate increases by around 2.5 percent for the young. Table 2 reports the corresponding percentage point estimates for the pooled treatment e↵ect. absent from the labor market for at least 12 months (during the last 15 months), receive a subsidy equivalent to the payroll tax. In other words, employers do not have to pay any payroll tax for these workers. The subsidy duration is limited to the period equal to the worker's previous unemployment duration, but capped at five years. Furthermore, in 2009, the subsidy rate was increased to twice the payroll tax.
Special rules apply to the young, the old and immigrants. Young unemployed, aged 20-25, need a non employment duration of 6 months (as opposed to 12) to be eligible. For those young workers, the maximum subsidy period is one year (as opposed to at most five, for older workers). Young workers have to have been unemployed during those 6 months, or enrolled in some other social program. Just being a student does not qualify for the subsidy. Immigrants are automatically eligible for the subsidy (irrespective of non employment duration). Individuals aged 55-65 have a subsidy duration equal to twice the time in unemployment (capped at 10 years). From July 2010 on, older workers only have to be non employed for 6 months before eligibility.
Robustness to excluding jobs with hiring subsidy. The hiring subsidy could confound our results if it was used more intensively among the young (for our market-level analysis) or among firms with many young workers (for our firm-level analysis). Therefore, a simple way to assess this potential confound is to repeat our main results but excluding all workers benefitting from the hiring subsidy from our employment measures. If the hiring subsidy is the cause of the e↵ects we find, then excluding workers benefitting from the subsidy should erase our results. In contrast, if our results persist unchanged after discarding workers benefitting from the subsidy, then the subsidy cannot explain our findings.
We have obtained administrative data on the universe of New Start Jobs beneficiaries from Statistics Sweden, and have linked this data set with our core earnings and firm level data set. This allows us to flag any worker who benefits from this subsidy. Results are presented in Figure  A22 . Panel (a) shows the share of employed workers aged 20-35 benefitting from this program (left y-axis) and the absolute number of participants (right y-axis) over time from 2007 to 2013. The panel shows that this was a relatively small program a↵ecting between 0.5 percent to 2 percent of the employed aged 20-35 over the period shows the share of employed workers benefitting from this program by age pooling years 2010 and 2011. It shows that participation in the program is only very slightly decreasing by age from around 2.2 percent at ages 21-26 and around 2 percent at ages 27-35. Therefore, this very small di↵erential is unlikely to confound our results. Panels (c) and (d) replicate our main results from Figure 4 (market level employment e↵ects) and Figure 6(a) (firm level employment e↵ects) but excluding workers benefitting from the hiring subsidy. In panel (c), workers benefitting from the hiring subsidy are excluded from both the employed numerator and the labor force denominator. Note that before 2007, the hiring subsidy does not exist so that the series for periods 2002-2004 and 2005-2006 are unchanged relative to 58 This is the consequence of what we saw in panel (b) : the fraction of the employed benefitting from the hiring subsidy is fairly constant by age. Therefore, we conclude that the New Start Jobs hiring subsidy does not confound our market-level employment results.
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In panel (d), workers benefitting from the hiring subsidy are excluded from employment counts at the firm level. Again, the new figure is virtually undistinguishable from the original Figure 6( a) . Therefore, we conclude that the New Start Jobs hiring subsidy does not confound our firm-level employment results either.
A.3.2 Reform of Temporary Contracts
The second reform that coincided with the youth payroll tax cut was a reform to the structure of temporary contracts.
2007 reform of temporary contracts. In July 2007, the government reformed the structure of temporary contracts. Before the reform, temporary contracts were permitted under a set of limited circumstances (e.g. untenured faculty; seasonal jobs;...). The 2007 reform removed this condition, permitting temporary contracts under any circumstances but restricting the contracts to last at most two years. After two years, the contract had then to turn permanent (whereas before the reform, no such limit existed on contract renewals). There was no age-specific clause either before or after the reform.
It is di cult to determine the "net e↵ect" of the 2007 contracts reform on the relative attractiveness of temporary and permanent contracts: on the one hand, temporary contracts were now broadly and unconditionally allowed, perhaps leading firms to substitute from permanent to temporary. On the other hand, for the existing stock of temporary contracts, those contracts were now required to turn permanent after two years, while previously indefinite renewals were possible.
Merging the labor force survey with our administrative data. Our administrative data does not have information on contract type; moreover, we do not see whether a continuing employment relationship churns through multiple temporary contracts or whether it has been on a single permanent relationship; similarly, we can not di↵erentiate whether short employment relationships end because a temporary contract was exhausted or because a permanent contract was dissolved.
To make progress, we merge the micro data underlying the Swedish Labor Force Survey (LFS) to our administrative data at the worker level. The LFS samples about 30,000 households annually and forms the basis of the construction of o cial unemployment statistics (ILO standard). Importantly, the LFS contains information on age, employment status and also contract type, which comprises permanent, temporary, self-employed. The LFS is only a small sample of the full population, and therefore, the results we obtain using this match do not have as much precision as our full population results. Robustness of the market-level employment e↵ects. We confirm that our market level employment e↵ects from Section II.C are not driven by a youth-biased expansion of temporary contracts. First, we replicate our employment e↵ects in the LFS irrespectively of contract type. Second, we show that the employment results are driven primarily by permanent contracts.
Third, we rationalize the unimportance of temporary contracts in our results by plotting the share of employment in temporary contracts by age and year and show that the reform did not expand the use of temporary contracts among the young and slightly expanded its use among slightly older workers. Figure A23 , panel (a) replicates our market-level employment results in the LFS. For each age group, we construct employment rates for each period, and plot these outcomes for our prereform and post-reform periods. Figure A23 , Panel (b) combines these years in two separate pre and post periods. Consistent with the population-level administrative data, employment increases among younger workers. The series are naturally noisier due to much smaller sample size. In Figure A23 , Panel (c) we present point estimates from a DD analysis of changes in employment from before to after the reform by age (solid blue circle series in panel (c)). The LFS traces out a similar (although noisier) hump-shaped treatment e↵ect as our administrative data that we depicted on Figure A13 , panel (a) .
Second, we decompose the employment e↵ect into permanent and temporary jobs in the same Figure A23 , Panel (c). Permanent jobs are defined as all jobs that are not temporary contracts so that total employment is the sum of temporary and permanent jobs. The dashed green line shows the DD estimate on employment in temporary jobs by age; the red dotted line shows the same series for permanent jobs. The green line is centered around zero for both the younger workers and the older workers, suggesting that the temporary contracts reform did not lead to an expansion in temporary jobs in Sweden for our LFS sample. Moreover, there is no age gradient, which reveals that the reform did not spur temporary job creation for young workers. The red dotted line, permanent employment, therefore explains the increase in employment, which is more pronounced for the workers aged 26 and below. 60 We conclude that the treatment e↵ect on youth employment is not explained by the reform to temporary contracts.
Third, we provide an explanation for this result. In panel (d) of Figure A23 , we plot the share of temporary jobs in total jobs at each age, for the pre-reform period 2002-2006 and the post-reform period 2009-2013. Indeed, there is a smooth gradient by age in the likelihood of being in a temporary jobs from 75 percent for workers aged 20, down to about 40 percent for workers aged 26-27 (at the discontinuity threshold for our payroll tax cut reform) and down to 15 percent at age 35. However, this plot confirms that the share of temporary contracts has stayed stable for the young workers in the post 2007 period, compared to the pre 2007 period under the old regime. If anything, older workers have seen a slight expansion in temporary contracts as a share of employment. Therefore, the importance of temporary contracts has not increased for young workers after the payroll tax cut. This is perhaps consistent with the a priori ambiguous net e↵ects (broader eligibility, but limitation to two years).
Robustness of firm-level results to temporary contracts reform. The temporary contract reform could a↵ect our firm-level results if two conditions are met (1) the temporary contract reform reduced hiring/firing costs for those firms heavily relying on those contracts, and (2) firms heavily relying on those contracts tend to have a high share young.
61 Perhaps the 60 A "swap" of temporary and permanent jobs emerges for older workers (aged 34-5) leaving total employment e↵ect constant but these swap e↵ects are not statistically significant due to relatively small sample size.
61 Daruich, Di Addario and Saggio (2017) study an expansion of temporary contracts in Italy and find employment and wage e↵ects. The features of the Swedish contracts reform contrast with Daruich, Di Addario and Saggio (2017) as the Swedish reform simultaneously capped temporary contracts use by requiring a job to turn permanent after two years. Moreover, we have already demonstrated that the reform did not increase the share market-level robustness check (which indicated that the 2007 reform did not actually appear to have spurred hiring into temporary contracts) masked heterogeneity between firms.
We cannot conduct our firm-level analysis with the LFS since we cannot observe all workers at a given firm in the LFS repeated cross-sections; we therefore cannot "net out" temporary jobs from our firm-level employment count as in our firm-level robustness check regarding the hiring subsidy. Instead, we investigate directly the degree to which firm-level payroll share young and share on temporary contracts are correlated -and whether high share young firms expanded temporary contracts use following the 2007 reform.
Specifically, we use the micro (household) data from the LFS, merged to our administrative population data. We pool all cross sections of this matched sample before and after 2007 (i.e. firms that have at least one worker in the LFS in a given cross section). We then rank all firms in the matched sample by their share young, and group these firms into 10 equally sized groups. Within each bin, we use the LFS micro data to construct the fraction of workers on a temporary contract. We do so separately for years 2002-2006 (pre-reform) and 2007-2013) (post-reform) . Figure A23 , Panel (e) plots this relationship for both periods. In both periods, we find a gradient: "younger" firms rely on temporary contracts more than "older" firms -a pattern mechanically expected from the worker-level age gradient of temporary contracts we previously documented in Figure A23 , panel (d). Importantly however, there is no systematic increase in the use of temporary contracts from pre-reform to post-reform for young intensive firms (relative to other firms). To see the time series evolution, Figure A23 , Panel (f) plots the evolution of the share in temporary contracts for the matched firms in the high and low share young groups, between 2003 and 2013. When the temporary jobs reform is introduced in 2007, if anything, the share in temporary jobs falls in the high share young firm group (heavily treated by the payroll tax cut we study). There is a brief uptick in 2011, and a return to (and below) pre-reform normal in 2013. By contrast, the control group (medium share young, less intensely treated by the reform) has a more stable evolution of share of workers on temporary contracts, but if anything ends 2013 with a slightly higher level than pre-reform 2006. In conclusion, while we see that indeed high share young firms are mechanically more relying on temporary contracts, the firm level results confirm the market-level results in panels (a) to (d) that if anything, temporary contracts have become less common among the young compared to slightly older peers.
We also note that we have already investigated turnover patterns in our worker-level longitudinal micro data in Figure 9 , where we plot the retention and employment probability of workers already employed with a given firm in 2006, for all subsequent years and pre period years. The figure confirmed that there was no di↵erential retention of those workers either before or after the reform, suggesting that the given cross section of the workforce did not in 2007 experience di↵erential contractual treatment with regards to the permanent/temporary dimension. This is consistent with the firm-level correlation in Figure A23 , Panel (f).
We therefore conclude that the 2007 reform to temporary contracts neither drive our marketlevel results nor our firm-level results, likely because that reform actually did not spur significant adoption of temporary contracts.
A.4 Firm-Level Survival and Balanced Panel
Firm survival. The tax cut could have a↵ected firm survival. This is an outcome of interest in its own right. However, such e↵ects would also render our sample of a balanced panel of of workers on temporary contracts, in contrast to the Italian reform.
firms (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) endogenous to the reform. We address this question in Appendix Figure A15 . For this exercise, we now consider all firms present in 2006 and operating with more than 3 workers in 2006, regardless of whether they operate in other years (or whether they have more than 3 workers when they operate). Firms are naturally assigned zero values for employment, sales, profits, etc. in years in which they do not operate. We then compare firms with a high share young in 2006 to firms with a medium share young in 2006, as we did for our benchmark analysis.
Panel ( Therefore, to analyze compellingly whether the reform a↵ects survival, we reweight firms in the medium share young group to align their 2006 firm-age distribution to the high share young group, using the nonparametric methods in DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) (DFL reweighting). We do so by partitioning each group into 8 firm-age based subsets and reweighting each subset so that, after reweighting, the fraction of firms in each age subset is equal across the two groups. We then plot again fraction of firms operating in each group for years 2003 to 2013 in Panel (b) of Figure A15 . Panel (b) shows that, after this age based DFL reweighting, the survival curves align perfectly both pre and post-reform. The pre-reform alignment is expected by definition of DFL reweighting by age in 2006. The post-reform alignment then suggests that the reform has actually no e↵ect on survival of high share young firms. That is, all of the exit e↵ect was purely compositional with regards to firm-age di↵erences. This absence of survival e↵ects justifies our use of the balanced panel for our main results. It also implies that the payroll tax cut a↵ected firm outcomes only at the intensive scale margin, but not at the extensive margin.
63 This finding also implies that the Great Recession is unlikely to introduce a bias in our analysis as a di↵erential e↵ect of the Great Recession on young intensive firms would very likely translate into a di↵erential survival rate during 2009 and 2010, the years when unemployment peaked.
Unbalanced panel. It is also possible to estimate firm e↵ects using the full sample of firms from Figure A15 (regardless of whether they operate in all years) and compare the two groups after DFL reweighting by age as done in Panel (b) . This exercise is presented in Appendix Figure A16 , where we trace out firm outcomes for employment, assets, sales, and profits relative to 2006 in four separate panels. In this case, non operating firms are assigned zero values. Therefore, this analysis is fully robust to endogenous survival e↵ects. Figure A15 shows that, thanks to DFL reweighting by firm-age, pre-trends are very well aligned for all outcomes (less so for the noisier variable of assets and profits).
After the reform, these unbalanced, DFL-reweighted graphs also show that firms with high share young expand employment, sales, and profits.
64 Series on assets are noisy and do not generate a significant e↵ect. We prefer to use the balanced panel of firms active in all years 2003-2013 for our baseline results rather than this full sample because the balanced panel approach does not require any DFL reweighting, making the analysis simpler and more transparent.
B Benchmarking Implied Cash E↵ects
A full model and assessment of the financial channel is beyond the scope of this paper and limited by the strong e↵ects we find even for firms that our imperfect proxies classify as less constrained. However, we can evaluate our firm-level findings quantitatively by investigating whether the size of our treatment e↵ect for the average firm could be entirely rationalized by a credit constraints channel only. While our sample and particular design di↵er from existing U.S. analyses with publicly traded, very large firms, our back of the envelope calculation suggests that our e↵ects are of the same order of magnitude, and that the cash channel could play an important role in the firm-level e↵ects.
The standard estimation in the corporate finance literature obtains a dollar-for-dollar e↵ect of a cash flow shock on capital investment (and thereby the capital stock) by regressing capital investment (or change) over lagged capital stock (
) on (endogenous or exogenous) cash flow shifts divided by the lagged capital stock (
CF K
). To benchmark our e↵ects, we cast our treatment e↵ect into an implied "dollar for dollar" version by rescaling appropriately. We then compare that implied e↵ect to the range of existing estimates in the corporate finance literature for capital.
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The total-asset di↵erential between the top group and the middle group opens up to 6 percent following the reform, i.e. K K = 6percent. The initial liquidity injection from the payroll tax cut corresponds to a 2.4 percent di↵erential in total labor cost reduction for the top vs. the middle groups, i.e. LC LC = 2.4percent.
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Our tax windfall is a di↵erential percentage shift in labor costs of 2.4 percent. We rescale it by firms' payroll-asset ratio in 2006 to obtain a dollar-for-dollar measure of the capital e↵ect from the tax windfall that can be benchmarked against the standard estimates:
For our sample of firms, the median labor cost-asset ratio is LC K = 0.7; the mean ratio is around .9 with or without winsorization; going forward we use the mid-point of .8.
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This simple rescaling links the 6 percent shift in assets with a 0.8 · 2.4percent = 1.92percent labor cost over asset shift, such that a $1.92 in -annual -labor cost reduction -and thus a cumulative liquidity injection from the tax windfall of $11.52 by the end of the six-year reform -, would be associated with the $6 increase in the final stock of total assets, six years into the reform. Read through the lens of credit constraints only, our estimate therefore implies an $0.52 capital stock-cash flow sensitivity. This compares to around $.2 to $.6 that the literature finds for publicly traded Compustat firms in the US (see e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988 for a classic study).
There are five reasons that may explain why our implied e↵ect -if indeed due to credit constraints -falls in the upper range of existing estimates. First, our sample contains many small firms, whereas the benchmark estimates refer to publicly traded Compustat firms in the U.S., which presumably are much less constrained.
68 Second, as discussed above, the tax reform not only generated an inframarginal cash injection but also lowered marginal costs and may lead to expansion up through a conventional scale e↵ect on top of the financial mechanism. Third, the benchmark estimates arise from variation in unexpected transient -i.e. one-time -shocks to cash flow, whereas we consider a persistent, expected series of tax windfalls. Such liquidity injections may imply considerably larger e↵ects because they may increase the constrained firm's credit worthiness ex ante. Fourth and relatedly, our medium-run analysis revealed that firms scale up, which would generate additional resources starting year 2 through an indirect multiplier e↵ect. Relatedly, the literature considers capital investment, our medium-run treatment requires a cumulative measure of capital stock growth. A short-run impact of incremental investment adds one to one to the capital stock (i.e. the cash flow sensitivities are similar whether capital stock or investment is the dependent variable, both normalized by lagged capital stock), whereas steady-state shifts are mediated by the depreciation rate. Fifth, note that our measure (total assets) also includes financial assets besides productive assets. While we find similar (yet noisier) percentage growth of fixed assets (and fixed tangible assets) in unreported specifications, the ratio of gross labor costs to those asset subtypes is considerably larger, which would imply a proportionately smaller dollar-for-dollar e↵ect of the tax windfall into such subcategories of total assets. Concretely, the median labor cost/fixed asset ratio is 2.75, and the labor cost/fixed tangible asset ratio is 3.75. Accordingly, the implied dollar-for-dollar e↵ect would then fall to the order of $0.10-0.15.
In conclusion, our estimates may indeed reflect an interesting medium-run change in resources that constrained firms use to expand their business, and this implied e↵ect is quantitatively consistent with the range of existing investment-cash flow sensitivities. Specifically, our e↵ects would correspond to a $0.1-$0.5 e↵ect on capital per dollar of tax windfall, which spans the range of existing estimates for the investment cash flow sensitivity of U.S. firms. While our firm activity findings could therefore be primarily driven by financial e↵ects, we note that a conventional scale e↵ect from marginal costs may also help explain the business growth patterns (albeit not the heterogeneity by financial constraints).
C A Simple Model with Pay Equity Constraints
We present a parsimonious labor market model that can account for most of our key findings. It adds one departure from the standard competitive model: a pay equity constraint that compresses net wages between worker types (here: young vs. old), and largely plays out within firms.
This pay equity constraint pushes the youth wage above the market-clearing level, which is below the old wage as the young are less productive than the old. (The old are on their labor supply curve and pin down everyone's net wage.) Hence, youth labor supply is rationed, youth unemployment emerges, and prevailing youth employment is labor-demand-determined.
The model accounts for the following nonstandard payroll tax facts we document: (i) The incidence of an employer payroll tax cut for the young falls fully into their labor costs, while (ii) their net wages do not change. (iii) Youth employment increases even if labor supply elasticities are small and despite a zero shift in net wages for the young. Augmenting the model with two firm types (youth intensive vs. old age intensive firms) can also replicate our cross-sectional firm-level e↵ect, where (iv) high share young firms expand scale and (v) these firms raise wages by more in response to a payroll tax cut for the young.
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In this environment, moving from homogeneous to age-dependent employer payroll taxes can o↵set the labor cost distortion from the equity constraint on net wages, and implement the frictionless age gradient of employment.
We first present the model with a representative firm and household that will account for the market-level findings. As a benchmark, we first discuss the model without the wage friction as a frictionless benchmark, where labor demand and supply will be equilibrated and standard incidence predictions are borne out. We then discuss how pay equity constraints a↵ect the labor market, as well as the e↵ects of age-dependent payroll taxes. Labor demand comes from a wage-taking representative firm. Next, we augment this model with two types of firms and a firm-specific labor supply curve (monopsony) to account for the firm-level results on top of the market-level results. Finally, we calibrate this full model and investigate whether the calibrated model can account for the treatment e↵ects presented in Table 4 .
C.1 Households: Labor Supply
For young and old households i 2 {y, o}, of equal mass, utility is quasi-linear in consumption c i and employment n i :
⇠ guides Marshallian, Hicksian and Frischian labor supply elasticities.
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i is the taste for work.
Labor supply is a function of the wage w i , and tastes i and ⇠:
69 Four additional empirical findings are beyond the scope of our model. First, rent sharing in our model works through a monopsony mechanism (firm-specific labor supply curve), which stands in for richer mechanisms of rent sharing of tax windfalls. Second, credit constraints are not active, such that the marginal cost channel drives labor demand responses, and we do not model capital. Third, since our pay-equity constraint is specialized to be fully binding, we cannot generate the progressive wage e↵ects within firms, although a slight extension to partial wage flexibility may do so. Fourth, we do not explicitly model worker flows through separations and hiring but consider net quantities, which stand in for long-term jobs.
70 In line with our evidence, we model the extensive margin on employment n i but preclude an intensive hours choice. ⇠ then captures the distribution of labor disutility in the respective age groups.
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C.2 Representative Firms and Labor Demand
CES production with young and old workers. The production function is:
where denotes overall return to scale. i is the productivity parameter of a given worker-age type i, where we assume y < o , i.e. younger workers are less productive than the old.
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x i is the production weight of type i, i.e. P i=y,o x i = 1. We introduce both i and x i because, when we turn to a version with multiple firm types with di↵erent weights x f i for each firm type f , reflecting technological bias.
Labor demand sets input i's marginal product equal to its gross wage (incl. payroll tax):
With CES, the ratio of these labor demand conditions implies: pins down desired input ratio
as a function of labor costs:
Plugging in for n j n i in (A4) with the desired skill ratio (A5), we obtain n i only as a function of the parameters of the production function and gross wages:
C.3 Benchmark: Frictionless Equilibrium -No Equity Constraints
Age gradients of labor market outcomes. Now consider the frictionless equilibrium without pay equity constraints. Our CES set-up could be extended to more than two age groups (rather than young and old) to trace out the worker ages corresponding to the empirical marketlevel age cuts, e.g. Figure 2 for employment and Figure 4 for net wages. Indeed, our analysis follows a di↵erence-in-di↵erence analysis, so we do not speak to aggregate absolute levels. So it is useful to not only focus on levels (end of this Section) but rather on the age gradient of labor market outcomes. This perspective is particularly convenient since our empirical analysis considers a shift in the payroll tax rate age profile, and because we will later on consider whether in general an age-dependent payroll tax regime may fully o↵set the wage friction (and thus restore the frictionless equilibrium we describe below as our benchmark).
To obtain the equilibrium, consider again the age gradient of labor demand from (A5):
The age gradient of labor supply arises from n
We first derive the age gradient of equilibrium net wages, which is the model analogue of our empirical market-level Figure 2 . Panel (a) shows an upward-sloping employment profile, which we will rationalize with productivity di↵erences (or taste di↵erences ):
The wage path is a↵ected by three factors: productivity di↵erences, taste di↵erences, and the payroll tax gradient. Taste di↵erences can only a↵ect wages if worker types aren't perfect substitutes (↵ = 1), in which case labor demand is perfectly elastic between worker types. Productivity di↵erences determine the wage gradient even if workers are perfect substitutes, in which case wages perfectly trace the di↵erences in the productivity terms.
In terms of payroll tax incidence into net wages, the payroll tax gradient acts exactly as the productivity gradient. As in the standard incidence framework, with elastic labor demand between worker groups (↵ ⇡ 1), workers' relative net wages bear the full incidence of payroll tax di↵erences in the cross-section. This case is our benchmark and our prior for our empirical analysis, since around the age discontinuity, workers should be close to perfect substitutes. For ↵ < 1, labor demand is not perfectly elastic for a given age group, and then labor supply elasticities ⇠ will mediate the incidence: if ⇠ ! 0, then relative net wages absorb age-dependent payroll taxes, without any employment e↵ect, irrespectively of the labor demand elasticity. But the closer ↵ to one, the less relevant labor supply factors become for incidence into net wages.
The model's age gradient of equilibrium gross wages captures the flip side of the net wage incidence results. With elastic labor supply, gross wages take the incidence of payroll taxes. When labor demand is cross-sectionally perfectly elastic (↵ close to one), then gross wages are invariant in payroll tax rates: Figure 2 , Panel (b) shows incidence for the age gradient of gross wages. We rejects the zero/small incidence into gross wages predicted by inelastic labor supply and elastic labor demand.
Finally, we consider the age gradient of equilibrium employment, the empirical analogue of which we trace our in market-level 
The employment incidence of payroll tax di↵erences are limited by low assumed labor supply elasticities even when labor demand is very elastic. We do find di↵erential employment impacts around the discontinuity that imply an equilibrium employment elasticity of around 0.21 (Table  2 ). With ↵ = 1, this would imply a labor supply elasticity (assuming a counterfactual equilibrium economy in which net wages increased) of 0.22, a realistic value. The tension is of course that the empirical results find a zero rather than 12 percent incidence on net wage di↵erentials for treated young workers (see Figure 2 , Panel (a)). A model with incidence along a standard, even moderately elastic labor supply is therefore not a good candidate for our facts.
Levels of age-specific labor market outcomes. Our empirical analysis of market-level e↵ects exploits di↵erence-in-di↵erence analyses, and therefore examines relative shifts in the employment and wage profiles rather than absolute e↵ects. For completeness we also present the closed forms of the level of equilibrium employment and wages, on which comparative statics could be performed:
Standard incidence predictions are borne out because we are in the competitive labor market. Level analysis of incidence in this environment is only slightly more complicated than crosssectional incidence in the age gradients.
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C.4 A Labor Market with Equity Constraints on Net Pay
We now show how a labor market with constraints provides a parsimonious refinement that helps the model account for the empirical facts. Wages for the young are constrained to equal those of the old workers due to pay equity constraints (w i = w j ). Old labor supply and demand 72 Most simply, with infinitely elastic labor demand (↵ = 1 and = 1), the expressions collapse to:
Gross wages are constant; net wages take the full incidence; employment responses depend on ⇠.
are in equilibrium and pin down the market-clearing old wage, which, due to our friction, also pin down youth wages. Such pay equity constraints distort the age gradient of net and gross wages, generating youth unemployment and nonstandard tax incidence patterns.
Equity-constrained net wages. The friction lies in the di↵erentiation of net wages. While we could consider a variety of plausible reduced-form representations that capture this phenomenon (e.g. wage compression, a constraint on adjacent age group's maximal wage gap,...), we consider an exposition with identical wages:
Old workers are on their labor supply curve, such that their labor market clears:
By contrast, youth labor supply exceeds the prevailing employment, given by labor demand:
Labor demand for factor i is:
Since wages are constrained to be identical, this expression becomes:
Equilibrium employment, net wages and gross wages of the old. We can now pin down the equilibrium employment level of the old, and therefore the old net and gross wages, which in turn pins down prevailing (disequilibrium) employment for the young and unemployment. By assumption, the old are on their labor supply curve, such that w o = (
Plugging this in (A23) for i = o, j = y, we obtain equilibrium employment for the old and their net and gross wages:
In contrast to employment level in the frictionless benchmark, the current expression does not contain any youth labor supply features (e.g. taste parameters) since they are o↵ their labor supply curve.
Prevailing youth employment is labor-demand-determined, because net wages constrained to be equal (but are too high to clear the market because the young are less productive ( y < o ), and therefore moves in lock-step with old equilibrium employment given firm's optimal skill mix from (A5):
Even the youth employment terms do not depend on youth labor supply terms (i.e. y ), unlike in the frictionless benchmark.
Age gradients. It is interesting to examine how the age gradients for employment, net wages and gross wages contrast with the frictionless equilibrium benchmark. We then turn to the incidence of age-dependent payroll taxes, and their potential to o↵set the underlying wage friction. By construction, the friction manifests itself as a flattened age gradient of net wages:
Since net wages are compressed due to the friction, the age gradient of net wages is always equal to one and are invariant in payroll tax di↵erentials. (The wage level will endogenously change as pinned down by incidence in the old labor market.) As a result, any payroll tax rate gradient therefore solely drives the age gradient of gross wages:
The age gradient of employment is, for any given equilibrium old employment level n eq o , directly given by the firm's labor demand preferences facing equal net wages yet potentially di↵erent payroll tax rates:
Comparison: frictionless equilibrium age gradient. Notably, the employment age gradient with equity constraints does not take into account any labor supply taste parameters of the young workers. To see this, compare the equity-constrained employment gradient with the frictionless age gradient for employment (A13).
Age-dependent employer payroll taxes to mimic the frictionless age gradient for gross wages and employment. Interestingly, payroll taxes can be set to have gross wages implement the frictionless age gradient for employment and gross wages (incl. a frictionless equilibrium with an arbitrary combination of payroll tax rates that may have been featured in the frictionless equilibrium to momic):
Our conceptual framework and the collection of all our findings suggest that some of this age gradient in unemployment is due to insu cient alignment of gross wages with productivity fundamentals along the life cycle, i.e. that the e↵ective labor cost per e ciency unit of labor are decreasing with age. We find that a net-pay equity friction, largely operating within firms, emerges as a plausible underlying friction. The generalization of our results, empirical and theoretical, is that an age-specific employer payroll tax schedule will be an e↵ective and simple way to equalize the employer-facing productivity-adjusted gross wages with wage constraints.
74 An age-specific employer payroll tax schedule is feasible because age is a fixed and easily observable attribute and therefore a suitable tag for di↵erentiated tax rates.
Payroll tax cuts for the old only. Since the market for the old clears, standard competitive intuitions apply. Tax incidence is guided by relative demand ( , ↵) elasticities and supply elasticities (⇠). With prime-aged workers being inelastic in their labor supply, their net wages will take the incidence -i.e. old net wages will increase -, and labor costs of the old (gross wages) will only slightly decrease. Since the old wages determines the youth wage, this process pushes up the gross wage of the young, making them less attractive to hire.
Encompassing payroll tax cuts. An interesting scenario is an encompassing payroll tax cut, i.e. one that a↵ects ⌧ y and ⌧ o equally. Employment for the young is determined by the old's employment and wage levels, which clear the labor market for the old (but not the young if productivity parameters or taste parameters di↵er). As a result, when both payroll tax rates change, intuitions are guided by standard incidence mechanisms for the old wages (and thus the young wage too, although that market does not clear). This prediction is consistent with aggregate net-wage incidence in response to encompassing payroll tax cuts. As a result, encompassing payroll tax cuts need not be e↵ective even if targeted payroll tax cuts are e↵ective, if equity constraints exist. As a result, targeted payroll tax cuts may be more e↵ective than encompassing ones. This prediction also di↵erentiates a pay-equity friction from a simple wage floor or wage rigidity, where payroll tax cuts would be e↵ective, at least in the short run.
Short-run vs. long-run e↵ects. (Encompassing) employer payroll tax cuts may be e↵ective in the short run under wage rigidities, but may be o↵set once wages adjust and realize the standard incidence predictions.
75 By contrast, in the presence of cross-sectional pay equity constraints, age-graduated payroll taxes might be able to flatten and lift the age gradient of employment for young or otherwise disadvantaged workers even in the long run. In fact, we found no net-wage incidence even six years into the reform, and persistent employment e↵ects.
Youth unemployment. In the Swedish case, youth nonemployment manifested itself as unemployment, which gave rise to the policy concerns that ultimately led to the intervention. A standard competitive model without frictions would not feature unemployment.
76 Our model generates a basic form of youth unemployment in form of rationed youth labor supply, i.e. the di↵erence between labor supply -at the old wage w y = w o -, and labor-demand-determined prevailing employment (A30). The presence of unemployment in form of rationed labor supply is a crucial ingredient in our model in that it rationalizes why employment increases can go along without net-wage changes even if labor supply elasticity ⇠ is very small, which the frictionless economy would struggle to explain.
Concretely, the count of young workers in unemployment is:
The unemployment rateũ is the ratio of the unemployed over the labor force, which here is desired labor supply:ũ
The youth unemployment rate is pinned down by two factors: labor supply (how many workers would like to work at the upward-distorted wage) and labor demand (the, downward-distorted) amount of jobs for the young). First, tastes for labor supply may di↵er between the two groups such that when considering any given going -homogeneous -wage (that of the old), the young workers may be less or more included to supply labor than the old (at that wage). This is captured by o y . For the useful benchmark case in which baseline tastes for labor are equal, this ratio is 1. We find this factor (taste di↵erences explaining participation di↵erences) less interesting because it would not carry over to an employment/population analysis.
The second source of unemployment is due to labor demand. It arises from the firm's upwarddistorted cost of employing a young worker in e ciency units given the pay-equity constraint and the lower productivity fundamentals of the young. For o = y and initially homogeneous tax rates ⌧ y = ⌧ o , we have youth unemployment as long as the young have lower productivity parameters x i i than the old.
The following payroll tax regime can eliminate youth unemployment from equity constraints:
Interestingly, this is generally not the schedule that would have the economy mimic the fric-76 While the payroll tax wedge would distort labor demand and supply as a labor wedge, each side of the market is on their respective demand and supply curves given gross and net wages. tionless equilibrium.
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C.5 Two Types of Firms
Lastly, we sketch one refinement to the model that helps it account not only for our market-level findings but also the firm-level heterogeneity and employment and wage e↵ects. Paralleling our empirical design, we introduce two types of firms f 2 {Y, O}: the youth-intense firms Y and old-intense firms O. In addition, we assume that the workers have CES preferences for their labor allocation. We sketch the model and point to the relevant mechanisms, but economize on space by not again solving for the full equilibrium. Crucially, the pay equity constraint works within firms, but not across firms.
C.5.1 Households Labor Supply
Rather than supplying labor to one firm, young households y and old households o supply labor to youth-intense firms Y and old-intense firms O, such that:
We preserve quasilinear utility but allow for CES-like aggregation of labor disutilities that generate firm-specific labor supply curves (we suppress taste parameters
The household incurs the standard ⇠-guided disutility of total labor supply n i , but also has preferences over smoothing out or concentrating labor supply between firm types, as guided by . The individual utility maximization FOC gives for i's labor supply to firms f and g 6 f :
(n
For = 1, the firm-specific labor supply preferences are separable, which precludes between-firm spillovers through wages, which we will conveniently use for a tractable exposition.
C.5.2 Labor Demand
The production function for a given firm f is:
where x f i now denotes the firm-specific weight in the production function of a given worker-age type i. so that P i=y,o x f i = 1. Age-bias x f i will generate the between-firm dispersion in youth intensity of firms in the model.
As before, we can express the labor demand for the old again as follows:
Equilibrium. With the convenient case = 1, the economy mirrors the representative-agent case discussed above.
78 Moreover, with the equity constraint in net pay within firms, we obtain the following equilibrium labor market outcomes:
As in the market-level analysis, the firm-level factor that guides employment and wage e↵ects is (now firm-specific) labor supply elasticity ⇠. Here, we broadly interpret ⇠ as a tractable way to model rent-sharing-like patterns in a labor monopsony narrative.
Deriving the labor cost share of young workers as the mediator of the firm-level e↵ects. Crucially for our identification design, we must show that the empirical sorting of firms by their labor-cost share young predicts larger elasticity of (old, but also overall) employment to a shift in the youth payroll tax rate in the model, and in turn into net wages paid by the firm. We do so with a simple comparative static argument of employment to the youth payroll tax.
Share young in the model. First, we define the empirically tractable statistic "payroll share of young in total payroll" in the model. Here it is endogenously chosen by profit-maximizing firms, with ultimate drivers of heterogeneity being di↵erences in firm types' CES weight on 78 The di↵erence is now that, with 6 = 1, we cannot directly replace w f o as a function of only n f o from the worker utility function, but there are between-firm-type wage spillovers through the worker's non separable labor disutility. Since we our cross-sectional di↵erence-in-di↵erence (or dosage treatment) design cannot pick up such spillovers, we here consider = 1 for clarify of exposition. 
The empirical variation of the cost share is plotted in Figure 5 , the histogram in Panel (a) and group-specific time series in Panel (b) .
Employment e↵ects. For youth employment we find the following elasticity:
For old employment we find the following elasticity:
Net wage e↵ects are guided by the elasticity of old employment and the labor supply elasticity, and inherit the dependence on the share of youth labor costs in total labor costs:
That is, our share young variable in the model corresponds to exactly the firm-level variable share young variable we construct in the empirical analysis with firm-level heterogeneity arises, driven from di↵erences in the CES weight on youth labor x f y . It guides both employment elasticities and the wage incidence in the model, directly providing structural justification of our empirical approach.
C.5.3 Calibrating the Firm Model to Match the Firm-Level Treatment E↵ects
Here we present a calibration of the model that generates theoretical e↵ects in line with the empirical treatment e↵ects on the firm-level employment and wage documented in Table 4 .
Total firm employment. In the model, the elasticity of firm-specific employment -is an equilibrium outcome, i.e. consistent with firm-specific labor supply. The labor market for the old workers clears; we impose perfect pay equity for the young, leading their labor supply to be rationed. The predicted total employment response (young plus old labor) for firm f 2 {Y, O} (youth-vs. old-heavy, corresponding to the high share vs medium share young firms) is the average of elasticity of youth labor y (A48) and of old labor o (A49), weighted by firm's share young in employment (thus in payroll)
Parameters. ⇠ is the firm-specific labor supply elasticity, is the degree of overall returns to scale in CES production; ↵ is the parameter guiding the substitutability of old and young labor. Treatment e↵ects: model vs. data. The treatment e↵ect on employment is 4.6 percent in Table 4 . The treatment is youth-tax shift d ln(1 + ⌧ y ) of around -12 percent. We therefore target a 4.6%/( 12%) ⇡ 0.38 elasticity di↵erence. The model's structural analogue of the treatment e↵ect is the di↵erence in the employment response between firm type Y and O in response to the youth tax shift d ln(1 + ⌧ y ), and therefore can be expressed in terms of elasticity di↵erences given the homogenous treatment: Table 3 we show the prereform (2007) summary statistics incl. share young by firm group f , and in Figure 5b we show the group-specific evolution. The initial di↵erence is around 20 percent, which falls towards 10 percent in the end. We empirically discipline the cross-sectional firm heterogeneity in share young by the mid-point, around y = Y y O y = 0.15. We have now reduced the calibration to targeting the bracketed right factor to around 0.38/15% = 2.53. There naturally are various parameterizations for our stylized model to match that target. We first note that the firmspecific labor supply elasticity is uniquely pinned down as ⇠ = 2.3 by the ratio of the firm-level employment e↵ects (4.6 percent) to wage e↵ects (2 percent) as in structural equation (A50). Then, for ↵ = 0.2 (youth and old workers are complements) and = 0.825, we obtain 2.53 for the right bracketed term.
80 Finally, note that these e↵ects are reallocation e↵ects, not necessarily allowing us to extrapolate the between-firm heterogeneity results to aggregate employment gains (and we ignore between-firm-type product and labor market interactions). 79 In the model, due to perfect pay equity, the payroll share is equal to the employment share. 80 Overall production has decreasing returns somewhat weaker than the labor share parameter we find in Table 3 , as we also find capital e↵ects, but this parameter also captures downward-sloping product demand. An alternative calibration is ↵ = 0.46 (lower complementarity) and = 0.72 (stronger decreasing returns), for example.
Wage e↵ects and rent sharing. An important additional question is whether the model can also generate the rent sharing e↵ects. The aforementioned expression denotes total e↵ects including equilibrium adjustment, specifically the firm going down its labor supply curve. The equilibrium wage di↵erential between the firm types is then given by d ln(w
⇤ , a fact we used to calibrate ⇠ = 2.3. The implied labor supply elasticity to the firm is therefore a crucial ingredient both for the employment elasticity as well as driving the rent sharing e↵ect, and it is encouraging that our findings imply a reasonably elastic value.
Assessing the implied absolute employment elasticities vs. relative treatment effects. An interesting cross validation check is to examine the absolute employment elasticities implied by this calibration fitted to match the cross-sectional treatment e↵ect heterogeneity. While our di↵erence-in-di↵erences identification strategy identifies parameter sets of relative responses, the calibrated model permits to then back out and evaluate implied absolute elasticities. We present elasticities reflecting equilibrium employment movements to youth tax changes, i.e. net of the labor supply and thus rent sharing responses. We parameterize the employment elasticities for old labor (A49) and young labor (A48) as described in our calibration matching the relative treatment e↵ect for employment. For share young levels, we use initial (Table 3) . For the absolute (rather than di↵erential) elasticities, we obtain -1.64 for youth labor and -0.40 for old labor in the high share young firms. For the medium share young firms, the youth employment elasticity is -1.40, and -0.15 for old labor.
In short, the model calibrated to reasonable values appears to fit the key treatment e↵ects estimated in our empirical analysis. Still, we note the stylized version of the model (two firm types, two labor types, perfect pay equity within the firm, absence of liquidity constraints, and a pure monopsony model of rent sharing), implying that alternative models and thus di↵erent parameterizations may well also account for the facts. We then follow that spell over time and define a separation in year t as having earnings from that same employer (who hired them in 2000) in year t but not in year t + 1 (the series are only slightly di↵erent if we allow for one-year-gaps in the spells, accounting for the generous parental leave system and sickness insurance). Age is defined as the age the person reaches during year 2000. The series depict the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of tenure, measured in months, for the work spells among such newly hired by age in 2000. We do not show the mean as the series are censored in 2013 (the last year of data). For young workers aged 20-26, the median spell is less than 2 years. The series implies that the absence of tax incidence on wages cannot be explained solely by the concern that all young hires will age out of the payroll tax eligibility on the job. Notes: This figure depicts the average monthly net wage (i.e., exclusive of the payroll tax) in Sweden by age for di↵erent time periods using the Structure of Earnings Survey data generally for the month of September (with some measurements in October and November) of each year. We consider two specific subsamples. The top panel displays the average wage within the top 20 percent of the wage distribution conditional on age and year. This top group is not a↵ected by the minimum wage floors. The bottom panel shows the average wage (measured in September) for new hires or job switchers, defined as having a new firm identifier as the main (i.e., highest paying) employer relative to September of the previous year. It includes both job-to-job transitions as well as new hires among the non employed. Both wage series are inflation adjusted (base-year 2003) and converted to USD using an exchange rate of 8.9 SEK/USD (as of 4/18/2017). Both graphs show no discontinuity in wages at the age thresholds implying that the absence of incidence on workers is not due to minimum wage floors (top panel) or rigid wages within a job spell (bottom panel). Corresponding estimates are provided in Wage earnings densities are measured typically in September (and sometimes October-November). Wages are adjusted for annual wage growth by first constructing a wage index based on the older individuals. Using this index, we deflate all workers' wages to 2013 values. The top panel shows that the net wage earnings densities do not change from pre-reform to post-reform both for young treated workers and for the control slightly older workers. In particular, even the earnings density substantially above the minimum wages for young workers is una↵ected. The top panel depicts in vertical lines the 20th and 80th percentiles of minimum wages (as there are many minimum wages in Sweden based on industry, occupation, and tenure). This shows that the vast majority of young workers are paid above the minimum wage. The bottom panel correspondingly shows that the labor cost density is shifted uniformly from pre-reform to post-reform for young treated workers. Notes: This figure compares our employment and unemployment measures with o cial statistics. Our measures are created using administrative full population data while o cial statistics are created using survey data. The top panel depicts the share of the population aged 20-34 in employment. The bottom panel considers the share of the labor force aged 20-34 (which includes the employed and the unemployed) in unemployment. In our data, a person is defined as employed when annual wage earnings (either from wages or self-employment) are above a minimum threshold of $4,940 in 2012 (and adjusted for inflation in other years). In o cial statistics, a person is defined as employed if he/she works at least one hour during the week of the survey (or has an employment contract, but was absent during the survey week). In our data, a person is defined as unemployed when he/she has zero earnings or earnings below the minimum threshold and has been registered with the unemployment agency for at least one day during the year. In o cial statistics, an individual is labelled unemployed if he/she is not employed but has applied for at least one job during the past four weeks. .03
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Employment / LF −effect 2.5 7.5 12.5 Employment threshold (kUSD) Notes: This figure investigates the robustness of the employment to labor force e↵ects depicted in Figure 4 , top panel. In the top panel, we add students to the labor force denominator. In the bottom panel, we keep the labor force constant (using the baseline definition) but vary the earnings threshold required for being labelled as employed. We then estimate the DD-specification in equation (1) and plot the coe cients of the reform-e↵ect along with 95 percent-confidence intervals. Both graphs show that the employment e↵ects we have obtained are robust to these alternative definitions. The estimates from adding students to the labor force are presented in row 2 of Table 2 . The bottom panel shows that employment to labor force e↵ects are strongest when employment is defined as annual wage earnings above $10,000. Notes: This figure depicts the heterogeneity in youth unemployment rate in 2006 across Swedish regions. Youth unemployment rate is defined as the unemployment rate (unemployed to labor force) among individuals aged 16-25. We follow the same definition as in our analysis on Figure 4 , Panel (a) . We divide all 21 regions of Sweden into five quintiles (population weighted) and use a color scale for each quintile from lightest (lowest unemployment rate) to darkest (highest unemployment rate). The legend next to the map displays the ranges of youth unemployment rates across each quintile. This division of regions underlies the analysis of heterogeneous employment e↵ects by size of unemployment rate depicted in Figure 4 , Panel (b) and Table A2 . Figure A11 for a map of the regions. The top panel shows a strong e↵ect of the reform in increasing the employment rate of young targeted workers (corresponding estimates in Table 2 ). The top panel shows that the employment e↵ects of the payroll tax cut appear much larger in the high unemployment regions than in the low unemployment regions. The bottom panel depicts the corresponding estimates from Appendix Table A2 (see notes of the table for Notes: The top panel depicts the change in employment rates pre-reform (2002-6) vs. post-reform (2009-2013) by age. Using the time series depicted in Figure 4 , we regress employment / LF on age dummies, period dummies and age dummies interacted with a dummy for the post-reform period for ages 20-35. The last set of dummies are shown in this graph (age 32 is the omitted category). The reported DD-estimate is simply the di↵erence between the treatment group (age group 20-26) and the control group (age group 27-35) weighted by the labor force at each age in 2005-6 (corresponding to first row of Table 2 ). The bottom panel decomposes these employment e↵ects into a hiring e↵ect and a separation e↵ect. The hiring e↵ect is estimated as follows. We compute the share of unemployed individuals in year t 1 who find a job in year t and estimate the treatment e↵ect on the log of that share using the same specification as for the top panel. The separation e↵ect is estimated as follows.
We compute the share of employed individuals in year t 1 who transition into unemployment in year t and again estimate the reform-e↵ect on the log of that share. The reported DD-estimates are the di↵erences between the treatment and control group before (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and after the reform (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) . The bottom panel shows that almost 4/5 of the employment e↵ects from the top panel are due to a reduction in the separation rate of young workers and that about 1/5 of the employment e↵ects from the top panel are due to an increase in the hiring rate of young workers. ) we DFL-reweight firms in the medium share young group to align their 2006 age distribution to the high share young group. We do so by partitioning each group into 8 age based subsets and reweighting each subset so that, after reweighting, the fraction of firms in each age subset is equal across the two groups. We then plot again fraction of firms operating in each group for years 2003 to 2013 in Panel (b) . The panel shows that post-reform survival rates across the two groups are identical suggesting that the reform does not di↵erentially a↵ect survival. Figure A15 , we DFL reweight firms based on their age in 2006 in order to make the two groups comparable in terms of pre-trends. Panels (a-d) show that pretrends are well aligned (except for profits) and that firms with high share young experience faster employment, sales, and profits growth after the reform consistent with the results using the balanced panel of firms in the main text. The series for total assets are noisier and do not show any significant e↵ect. Corresponding estimates are presented in Table 4 , column (4). Notes: This figure repeats Figure 6 , Panel (a) on the e↵ects on firms of the payroll tax cut on the growth of employment (relative to 2006) but splitting the sample by proxies for credit constraints as of 2006. Each of the three rows considers a specific proxy for credit constraints: (1) age of the firm, (2) liquid assets over total assets, (3) size of firm measured by net sales. In each row, the left panel is for firms with low credit constraints and the right panel for firms with high credit constraint based on the proxy being above or below median (in 2006) . In all cases, pre-trends are parallel supporting our identification assumption. Overall, we find employment responses in all types of firms, constrained or not, but responses are larger for firms more likely to be credit constrained based on the proxies (see Table 5 for corresponding estimates). Notes: This figure repeats Figure 6 , Panel (a) on the e↵ects on firms of the payroll tax cut on the growth of total assets (relative to 2006) but splitting the sample by proxies for credit constraints as of 2006. Each of the three rows considers a specific proxy for credit constraints: (1) age of the firm, (2) liquid assets over total assets, (3) size of firm measured by net sales. In each row, the left panel is for firms with low credit constraints and the right panel for firms with high credit constraint based on the proxy being above or below median. In all cases, pre-trends are parallel supporting our identification assumption. Overall, we find asset growth in all types of firms, constrained or not, but responses are larger for firms more likely to be credit constrained based on the proxies (see Table 5 for corresponding estimates). Notes: This figure investigates whether the temporary-contracts reform in 2007 can confound our results. Panels (a)-(b) replicate our baseline market-level employment results using the Labor Force Survey data, which contain information on contract type. In Panel (c), we decompose the employment e↵ects into temporary and permanent contracts. The positive employment e↵ects are driven by permanent jobs not temporary contracts. Panel (d) depicts the share of employed workers in temporary jobs by age before and after the reform. The reform did not expand temporary contracts among the young and only slightly expanded temporary contracts among older workers. This explains why temporary contracts cannot confound our market-level employment results. Panels (e) and (f) present firm-level relationships between share of payroll eligible for the payroll tax cut we study, against share of workers on temporary contracts, and how these shares evolve over time. The share of temporary contracts remains stable from pre-reform to post-reform in both high share young firms and medium share young firms. Hence the temporary contract reform cannot confound our firm-level employment results. Complete details are in the online Appendix Section A.3.1. Figure A11 . Youth unemployment rates for each quintile are reported in column (1). Within each quintile, we follow the methodology from Table 2 and run a simple OLS regression of the aggregated time series (2002-2004; 2005-2006; 2009-2011 and 2012-2013) Notes: This table presents e↵ects of the payroll tax cut on hiring and separations following the model of Table 2 . We regress each outcome variable on 16 age dummies (ages 20 to 35), a post-reform dummy, and the interaction of the post-reform dummy and an age eligibility (ages 20-26) dummy. The table shows coe cients on the last regressor. Unemployment-Employment transitions are defined as the share of unemployed in year t 1 who become employed in year t and Employment-Unemployment transitions are defined as the share employed in year t 1 who enter unemployment in year t.
